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The Meaning of the "Corporate Constituency"

Provision of the Illinois Business
Corporation Act
Thomas J. Bamonte

I. INTRODUCTION

During the height of corporate takeover activity in the mid-1980's,
the Illinois legislature added section 8.85, a so-called "corporate
constituency" provision, to the Illinois Business Corporation Act
("BCA").' Section 8.85 allows corporate directors and officers,
"when considering the best short-term and long-term interests of.the
corporation," to consider the effects of any action upon employees,
suppliers, customers, local communities, and other pertinent factors.2
Over half
of the states have adopted similar corporate constituency
3
statutes.
* Partner, Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd. Adjunct Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent School
of Law. B.A., 1978, University of Chicago; J.D., 1983, Northwestern University
School of Law.
I. Business Corporation Act, Pub. A. No. 83-1025, 1983 111.
Laws 6943 (codified at
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/1.01-117.05 (West 1995)). Illinois' "corporate
constituency" provision is quoted in full at infra note 41 and accompanying text.
2. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/8.85 (West 1995).
3. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-313(e) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West
1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (Supp.
1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1602, 30-1702 (Supp. 1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805,
§ 5/8.85 (1992); IND. CODE §§ 23-1-35-1(d), (f), (g) (Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE §
491.101B (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G)(2) (West Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716
(West Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156 B, § 65 (Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. §
302A.251(5) (1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (Supp. 1990); Mo. REV. STAT. §
351.347.1(4) (Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035(1)(c) (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14A:6-1(2) - 14A:14(4) (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(d) (Michie
1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1994); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1711-1712, 1715-1717, 1721 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (Supp. 1990);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (1991); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (1990); WYO. STAT.
§ 17-16-830 (e) (1989); see also, Symposium, Corporate Malaise-Stakeholder
Statutes: Cause or Cure, 21 STETSON L. REv. 279-93 (1991) [hereinafter "Symposium"]
(listing and analyzing the various corporate constituency statutes).
Some corporations have adopted charter provisions authorizing directors to take into
account non-shareholder constituency interests when considering a takeover bid. See
Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Business Law of the American Bar
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The corporate takeover battles of the 1980's left extensive case law
in their wake. Courts analyzed both the common law duties of corporate directors when corporate control is at stake4 and the various
antitakeover statutes enacted by the states.5 Corporate constituency
statutes, however, though widely adopted,6 have never been subjected
to comparable judicial scrutiny. In light of the current resurgence in
merger and acquisition activity, 7 this Article examines the meaning of
section 8.85 and considers what impact, if any, it has on the legal
duties owed by directors and officers of Illinois corporations.
This Article first examines the historical development of corporate
constituency statutes,' including the rise 9 and fall'0 of the shareholder
wealth maximization theory of fiduciary duties. The Article then discusses and analyzes section 8.85, Illinois' corporate constituency
statute, focusing on the statute's rejection of the shareholder primacy
theory." Next, the Article discusses the new challenges for corporate
directors posed by the statute, 2 and the changes the statute brings to
Illinois corporate law.' 3 Finally, the Article concludes by observing
that section 8.85, though widely viewed as an antitakeover device,
actually clarifies years of conflicting judicial decisions by adopting an
"entity" theory of the corporation. 4

Association, "Other Constituency Statutes: Potentialfor Confusion, " 45 Bus. LAW.
2253, 2257 (1990).
4. See, e.g., Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp. Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994);
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del.
1994); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990);
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Citron v.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989); Barkan v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
5. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877
F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
6. See statutes cited supra note 3.
7. See Greg Steinmetz, Mergers and Acquisitions Set Records But Activity Lacked
That 80's Pizzazz, WALL ST. J.,
January 3,1995, at R 8.
8. See infra part 11.
9. See infra part II.A.
10. See infra part lI.B.
11. See infra part Ill.
12. See infra part IV.A.
13. See infra parts IV.B. and IV.C.
14. See infra part V.
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II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ILLINOIS' CORPORATE
CONSTITUENCY STATUTE

Illinois law prior to the enactment of Section 8.85 did not clearly
define the parties to whom corporate directors owed a fiduciary duty. 5
Most Illinois courts held that directors owed a fiduciary duty to both
the corporation and to the corporation's shareholders.' 6 This definition of a corporate director's fiduciary duties is rife with contradiction. A frequently quoted statement captures the internal conflict
inherent in what was the prevailing Illinois approach:
The directors of a corporation are trustees of its business and
property for the collective body of stockholders in respect to
It is their duty to administer the corporate
such business ....
affairs for the common benefit of all stockholders and exercise

their best care, skill, and judgment in the management of7 the
corporate business solely in the interest of the corporation.'

The hostile takeover activities of the 1980's graphically exposed the
problem with this formulation.' 8 When fundamental corporate issues
are at stake, particularly control over the corporation, the "common
benefit of all stockholders" and the "best interests of the corporation"
may diverge sharply. 9 Hostile takeovers were commonly viewed as
pitting the shareholder's short-term interests in profit maximization
against the best long-term interests of the corporation. The corpo15. Throughout this article, "directors" includes both corporate officers and directors.
Section 8.85 is a somewhat unusual corporate constituency statute in that it expressly
applies to corporate officers as well as directors. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, §
5/8.85 (stating that the statute applies to "the board of directors, committees of the
board, individual directors, and individual officers .... ").
16. See, e.g., Wencordic Enter., Inc. v. Berenson, 511 N.E.2d 907, 909 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987); Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224, 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
17. Dixmoor Gulf Club v. Evans, 156 N.E. 785, 787 (I1. 1927) (emphasis added). A
leading treatise on Illinois law perpetuates this internal contradiction by relying upon
the Dixmoor formulation when describing the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. 13
ILLINOIS LAW AND PRACTICE, Corporations,§ 322 (1955 & Supp. 1994).
18. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 242 (1991)
(stating that "[the hostile takeover explosion fractured the complacently assumed unity
of interest between the corporate entity and shareholders.").
19. Id. Discussing the inherent ambiguity in defining the board's duty to "the
corporation and its shareholders," Delaware Chancellor William Allen stated:
[T]his particular phrase masks the most fundamental issue: to what interest
does the board look in resolving conflicts between interests in the
corporation that may be characterized as "shareholder long-term interests" or
"corporate entity interests" or "multi-constituency interests" on the one hand,
and interests that may be characterized as "shareholder short-term interests" or
"current share value interests" on the other?
TW Services, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,334, at 92, 178 n. 5 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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ration's long-term interests include the interests of labor, creditors,
suppliers, and other local community "constituents" integral to the
success of the corporation.20 Illinois law, which imposed a fiduciary
duty on directors to both the shareholders and the corporation, provided no effective guidance in this situation and, indeed, posed a major
problem.
A. The ShareholderWealth Maximization Theory
of FiduciaryDuties
One suggested solution to the dual standard problem, which gained
substantial academic support, posits shareholder wealth maximization
as the primary duty of the directors. 2 This "shareholder primacy"
approach is based on a recognition that shareholders are in a fundamentally different position than other corporate constituents. 22 Constituents such as employees, creditors, and suppliers contractually
secure for themselves a fixed return and a degree of protection from
the corporation's opportunistic behavior.23 Shareholders, in contrast,
are only "residual claimants" to the corporation's profits. 24
Basing their arguments on the principle of shareholder wealth
maximization, advocates of shareholder primacy argue that shareholders need the protection of fiduciary duties. Such duties lower the
agency costs associated with opportunistic behavior by those who
control the corporation. 25 Fiduciary duties owed by directors to
20. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in
the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986) (discussing the conflicting interests
present in the corporate structure). Commentators who favor an open market for
corporate control concede that the short-term impact of a corporate takeover on some
corporate constituents can be very hard. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities,
Firm-Specific Capital Investments and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate
Changes, 1989 DUKE L. J. 173 (noting that fundamental corporate changes such as
mergers, hostile takeovers and plant closings disrupt the lives of everyone connected
with the affected corporation). A short-term perspective may be the only relevant
perspective for many low-wage workers with limited savings.
2 1. During the early 1980's, the view that corporate directors owed a primary duty to
shareholders gained much influence. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1161 (1981); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1982)
(striking down the Illinois antitakeover statute and adopting the "Chicago School" view
emphasizing the importance of an open market for corporate control).
22. See Millon, supra note 18, at 227-33 (providing a historical overview of
shareholder primacy approach).
23. See Millon, supra note 18, at 227-33.
24. See Millon, supra note 18, at 227-33.
25. See generally Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1447 (1989) (arguing that investors and managers can align their
interests to achieve a common goal). An earlier theoretical justification for the
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shareholders function, in effect, as a de facto contract, supplied by
state corporate law, for the benefit of the shareholders.26
At the same time that the shareholder primacy argument gained
substantial academic support, the market for corporate control boomed
as hostile takeover activity reached unprecedented heights.27 Strong
opposition to the high levels of takeover activity developed based on
the perception that "bust up" corporate takeovers created harmful
effects on employees, local communities, bondholders and other corporate constituents.8 Critics of takeover activity contended that a
substantial portion of the "control premiums" paid to shareholders in a
takeover represented an unfair expropriation of wealth from other corporate constituents. For instance, critics pointed to bondholders who
faced increased credit risks because of new debt incurred to finance
takeovers and to employees who lost their jobs as a result of "downsizing" in the wake of takeovers.'
B. Courts and Legislatures Reject the ShareholderPrimacyApproach

Heeding the criticism levied against the high level of takeover
activity, courts rejected the theory of shareholder wealth maximization,
except in limited circumstances where the breakup or sale of the comprinciple of shareholder primacy is to view the relationship between management and
shareholders as a trust relationship, with management acting as trustees of the
shareholders' property, i.e., the corporation. See A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers
in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). Many Illinois cases from earlier this century
relied upon the trust analogy when discussing the duties owed by directors. See, e.g.,
Dixmoor, 156 N.E. at 787-88.
26. See Henry Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, I I GEO. MASON L.
REV. 99, 119-20 (1989).
27. See Millon, supra note 18.
28. See A. Schliefer and L. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988); F.M.
Scherer, Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 69
(1988).
29. See William W. Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time
of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L. J. 92; Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the
Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1196-1203 (1991); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21
STETSON L. REV. 45 (1991); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (stating that the state and locality from which the transfer is made suffer
significantly from the after effects of a corporate takeover). In their corporate law
treatise, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel mount a spirited attack on claims that
changes in corporate control through tender offers harm non-shareholder constituents.
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW, 201-04 (1991). The data shows that the shareholders of target companies realize
premiums of roughly 30 percent. See Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate
Central: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988).
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pany was "inevitable." 3 ° Courts made clear that directors could consider the impact of a takeover on constituencies other than shareholders. Directors were allowed to consider creditors, customers,
employees, and even the community. 3' In addition, courts permitted
32
directors to establish antitakeover devices such as the poison pill.
Courts also allowed directors to rely on long-term corporate plans or
the protection of special cultural features of the corporation to thwart a
takeover transaction clearly favored by a majority of the shareholders.33
Unfortunately, courts never satisfactorily resolved the debate
concerning to whom directors owe their primary fiduciary duty. Some
decisions continued to subordinate the interests of non-shareholder
constituents to shareholder wealth maximization, while other decisions
permitted consideration of interests other than the shareholders. 34

30. See Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182; see
also Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 43 (stating
that a sale of control imposes a special obligation on directors to act reasonably so as to
seek the transaction offering the best value available to the stockholders). As the
Delaware Supreme Court stressed: "absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under
Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is not
under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the
context of a takeover." Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at
1150; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware FiduciaryDuty
Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49
Bus. LAW. 1593 (1994) (analyzing Delaware fiduciary law and discussing the
significance of the modem trend toward a unified concept of fiduciary law).
31. Time, 571 A.2d at 1153 (endorsing Unocal as a flexible analytical tool allowing
the board to consider non-shareholder constituencies). See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (Del. 1987) (stating that under appropriate
circumstances the board may consider the impact a takeover may have on nonshareholder constituencies).
Some pre-Unocal cases also endorsed director
consideration of non-shareholder interests. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d
1081, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972); Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697
(E.D. Pa. 1986); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
32. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351-53 (Del. 1985). A
poison pill is defined as "a defensive tactic used by a company that is a target of an
unwanted takeover to make its shares or financial condition less attractive to an
acquirer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 71 (6th ed. 1990).
33. Time, 571 A.2d at 1154.
34. Compare Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176 (recognizing the propriety of the board's
consideration of non-shareholder interest, but stating that some rationally related
benefit must accrue to the stockholders) with Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (allowing board
to consider non-shareholder interests in determining whether takeover bid is in best
interest of the corporate enterprise, without explicitly requiring board to find that
shareholders are thereby benefited).
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Largely at the prompting of the incumbent management of sizable
local companies fearing hostile takeovers," state legislatures enacted a
formidable arsenal of antitakeover laws.36 Corporate constituency
statutes typically were rushed through state legislatures as part of these
antitakeover legislation packages. 37 In addition to antitakeover provisions,38 the various constituency statutes have four other common
features: (1) the statutes allow-but generally do not require-directors to consider the interests of constituents other than shareholders;
(2) the statutes reject the shareholder wealth maximization approach
and instead focus director duties on serving the best interests of the
corporation; (3) the statutes apply both in calm times and when corporate control is at stake; and (4) the statutes do not expressly vest the
corporate constituents (the purported beneficiaries of the statutes) with
any legally enforceable rights. 3
III. THE ILLINOIS CORPORATE CONSTITUENCY STATUTE:
A REJECTION OF THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
APPROACH IN ILLINOIS

In 1985, Illinois adopted section 8.85 of the BCA, a corporate
constituency provision, as part of an antitakeover legislation
package. 40 Section 8.85 reads as follows:
DISCHARGE

OF

DUTIES-CONSIDERATION.-In

discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of
directors, committees of the board, individual directors and
individual officers may, in considering the best long term and
35. See Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L.
REV. 111 (1987).

36. See generally Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State
Takeover Statutes, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 846 (1989) (noting that since 1982 over half the
states have enacted at least one of the several standard statutory responses to hostile
corporate takeovers). The most popular antitakeover laws which survived judicial
scrutiny included "control share," see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S.
69 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of Indiana control share acquisition statute), and
"business combination" statutes. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods
Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989) (upholding
constitutionality of Wisconsin business combination statute); BNS Inc. v. Koppers
Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988) (upholding Delaware business combination
statute).
37. See, e.g., Diane S. Kaplan, Round Two: Illinois' Second Generation Takeover
Legislation, 36 DEPAUL L. REv. 361 (1987) (describing the contemporaneous adoption
by the Illinois General Assembly of the § 8.85 and § 7.75 "fair price" antitakeover
provision).
38. Section 8.85, Illinois' corporate constituency statute, was similarly enacted as
part of antitakeover legislation. See Kaplan, Supra note 37.
39. See supra note 3 for a list of the various corporate constituency statutes.
40. See Kaplan, supra note 37.
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short term interests of the corporation, consider the effects of
any action (including without limitation, action which may
involve or relate to a change or potential change in control of
the corporation) upon employees, suppliers and customers of
the corporation or its subsidiaries,communities in which offices
or other establishments of the corporation or its subsidiaries are
located, and all other pertinent factors. 4 '

Section 8.85, like the majority of case law 42 and the various state
antitakeover laws,43 rejects the shareholder primacy approach.
Instead, section 8.85 establishes that the primary duty of directors is to
act in the "best interests of the corporation." Despite its genesis as an
antitakeover device, 4 section 8.85's importance, thus, extends far
beyond the takeover arena.
As a result of section 8.85, directors are not legally bound to treat
shareholder interests superior to the interests of the other corporate
constituents.45 On its face, section 8.85 establishes that the directors
of Illinois corporations owe a primary duty to the corporation. 6 The
primary duty directors owe to the corporation supersedes any duty
owed to any particular corporate constituency, including shareholders.47 Thus, section 8.85 begins with the premise that directors
and officers "discharg[e] the duties of their respective positions...
[by] considering the best long term and short term interests of the
corporation."48
41. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/8.85 (West 1995) (emphasis added) (the
emphasized portion of the statute was added by amendment in 1989, at the same time the
Illinois control share acquisition statute, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/11.75, was
enacted).
42. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
44. Section 8.85 was adopted in conjunction with a so-called "fair price" antitakeover
provision, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/7.75 (West 1995); see generally Kaplan,
supra note 37 (discussing Illinois' adoption of §§ 8.85 and 7.75). For a description and
critique of § 7.75, see William J. McKenna & John H. Bitner, The "Fair Price"
Amendment to the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 67 CHI. B. REC. 64 (1986). In
1989, Illinois adopted a "business combination" antitakeover statute which can be
found at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/11.75 (West 1995). See Frank M. Calvert,
The New Illinois Business Combination Statute: A Shift in the Balance of Control, 2
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 3 (1989).
45. See generally Ronn S. David, Constituency Statutes: An Appropriate Vehicle for
Addressing Transition Costs?, 28 COLUM. J.L. AND SOC. PROBS. 145, 148 (1995)
(describing constituency statutes as a "potentially radical break with the orthodox view
that corporations should confine themselves to activity that maximizes the wealth of
their shareholders").
46. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/8.85. (West 1995).
47. Id.; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
48. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/8.85. (West 1995) (emphasis added).
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A. The HistoricalRoots of Section 8.85 Evidence An Intent to Reject
the ShareholderPrimacy Theory
The historical circumstances surrounding the statute's adoption in
1985 indicate that section 8.85 is best characterized as a decisive and
intentional rejection of the view that corporate law requires directors to
treat shareholder wealth maximization as their primary duty.4 9 Section
8.85 allows directors, in promoting the best interests of the
corporation, to give substantial consideration to the interests of nonshareholder constituents beyond that mandated by the contracts with
those constituents.5
Examination of the law in Illinois prior to the enactment of section
8.85 sheds light on the purpose of the provision. Before the adoption
of section 8.85, Illinois law allowed directors to focus on the best
interests of the corporate enterprise by considering the interests of nonshareholder constituencies and adopting a long-term perspective." In
other words, Illinois law already allowed directors to consider nonshareholder interests using a long-term perspective within a framework
in which the directors are to serve the "best interests of the corporation
and the stockholders." 2 Thus, if all section 8.85 did was to codify the
existing common law rules, it was hardly necessary. Presumably, the
drafters intended section 8.85 to do more.
Section 8.85 does, in fact, do more. By attempting to resolve an
inherent conflict between the best interests of the shareholders and the
best interests of the corporation,53 section 8.85 substantially changes
Illinois corporate law. Section 8.85 establishes that the director's primary fiduciary duty is to the corporate entity.' This, in turn, reduces
49. See Kaplan, supra note 37, at 374-77.
50. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/8.85 (West 1995) (advising that directors
should consider the effects of any action "upon employees, suppliers, and customers of
the corporation or its subsidiaries, communities in which offices or other
establishments of the corporation or its subsidiaries are located ....").
5 1. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (II1. App. Ct. 1968). In Shlensky, the
court affirmed the dismissal of a shareholder suit challenging the owner's failure to
install lights at Wrigley Field. Id. The owner opposed the installation of lights because
in his opinion baseball was a daytime sport and he believed that night baseball games
would cause the surrounding neighborhood to deteriorate. Id. at 778. The shareholder
plaintiff alleged that the team could have earned more money if lights were installed. Id.
at 777. The court concluded that the directors' consideration of the impact of night
baseball games on the neighborhood was proper because neighborhood quality related to
the "long run interest of the corporation" in attracting patrons and preserving the value
of the Wrigley Field property. Id. at 780.
52. Id. at 780.
53. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict
involved.
54. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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the status of shareholders to a position of one among a set of corporate
constituents.55 In order to dispel any doubts, however, section 8.85
might be amended to add shareholders to the list of corporate constituents whose interests the directors may consider in performing their
primary duty to act in the corporation's best interests.
By establishing the best interests of the corporate enterprise as the
primary duty of corporate directors, section 8.85 marks an important
development in Illinois corporate law. In prior years, Illinois courts
made a variety of often conflicting statements to describe the duties
owed by directors. One formulation, consistent with section 8.85,
proposed: "[iut is the duty of directors to manage the corporate busiAnother formulation,
ness solely in the interest of the corporation.
defining the scope of fiduciary duties much more broadly, opined:
"[t]he relation of directors of a corporation to its stockholders, towards
the corporation, and in many instances towards its creditors, is a fiduciary relationship. ' 58 The most popular formulation in Illinois case
law, however, suggested that directors and officers owe a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and to the shareholders.59

55. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constituent
interests a director may consider.
56. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statute's
failure to mention shareholders. The Indiana corporate constituency statute, for
example, provides that the "directors are not required to consider the effects of a
proposed corporate action on any particular corporate constituent group or interest as a
dominant or controlling factor." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(0 (West 1995). The
Indiana statute also expressly includes shareholders as corporate constituents. IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (West 1995). See also 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1515 (1995)
(including shareholders as corporate constituents, although directors are not required to
regard any corporate interest as dominant or controlling).
The Iowa corporate constituency statute states explicitly that shareholders do not
occupy a preferred position among the corporate constituents:
[clonsideration of any or all of the community interest factors [e.g., interests
of corporate constituencies] is not a violation of the business judgment rule or
of any duty of the director to the shareholders, or a group of shareholders, even
if the director reasonably determines that a community interest factor or
factors outweigh the financial or other benefits to the corporation or a
shareholder or group of shareholders.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B(2) (West 1995). See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying
text.
57. Poliquin v. Sapp, 390 N.E.2d 974, 977 (Ii. App. Ct. 1979); see also Shlensky
v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793, 799 (1i1. 1960) (stating that corporate
directors occupy a fiduciary relation toward the corporation); Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club,
Inc. v. Noble, 210 N.E.2d 12, 15 (I11. App. Ct. 1965) (same).
58. Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 67 N.E.2d 265, 275 (111. 1946)
(citations omitted).
59. See cases cited supra notes 16-17.
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Section 8.85, if given full effect, should put an end to the latent
ambiguity that currently exists in Illinois case law with respect to the
duties owed by directors. 60 Under section 8.85, directors owe a primary duty to the "corporation," not to any particular corporate
constituent. 6' Likewise, directors can consider any "pertinent" interest
of any corporate constituent in discharging their duty to act in the best
long-term interests of the corporation.62 Section 8.85 relieves directors of the legal responsibility to place the interests of shareholders
above those of the other corporate constituents.
B. The Language of Section 8.85 Indicates a Legislative Intent to
Reject the ShareholderPrimacyApproach
The Illinois General Assembly carefully drafted section 8.85 ensuring that it consists of both mandatory and permissive components.
The statute requiresdirectors and officers to consider the best interests
of the corporation in discharging their duties.63 In considering the best
interests of the corporation, however, the statute allows directors and
officers to consider (or not to consider) the interests of the various corporate constituents. 64 In other words, section 8.85 does not require
the directors to take into account the interests of any particular corporate constituency. 65 Rather, the statute permits directors to consider a
wide range of interests so that the direc-tors can fulfill their overriding
duty to define and pursue the best interests of the corporation.
60. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
61. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/8.85 (West 1995); see supra notes 41-48 and
accompanying text.
62. Id.; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
63. The statute provides: "In discharging the duties of their respective positions
[officers and directors] may, in considering the best long and short term interests of the
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, §
corporation, consider the effects of any action ....
5/8.85 (West 1995) (emphasis added). The emphasized language indicates the prime
directive imposed on all officers and directors by § 8.85.
64. The statute provides:
"In discharging the duties of their respective positions . . . [officers and
directors] may . . . consider the effects of any action (including without
limitation, action which may involve or relate to a change or potential change
in control of the corporation) upon employees, suppliers and customers of the
corporation or its subsidiaries, communities in which offices or other
establishments of the corporation or its subsidiaries are located, and all other
pertinent factors."
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/8.85 (West 1995) (emphasis added).
65. Only Connecticut requires directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder
constituents. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West 1995) (stating that "a
director... shall consider... (3) the interests of the corporation's employees, customer,
creditors and suppliers, and (4) community and societal considerations including those
of any community in which any office or other facility of the corporation is located.").
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The language in section 8.85 instructing directors to consider the
best "long term" interests of the corporation provides another clear
signal that section 8.85 subordinates shareholder interests to those of
the corporate entity. For instance, the statute supports a board of
directors rejection of a takeover bid that would give shareholders a
sizable, immediate premium on the ground that the long-term interests
of the corporationwould be better served if no change in control occurred.66 Indeed, section 8.85's use of the language "long-term interests" can reasonably be read as a legislative preference for the interests
of the corporation as a whole, as defined by incumbent management,
67
over the interests of shareholders or any other corporate constituent.
Equally as important as what the statute contains is what the statute
omits: the statute fails to mention shareholders. 68 Shareholders are not
even included as one of the constituents whose interests the directors
may consider. 69 The statute's omission of any reference to shareholders is significant and surely no accident. Presumably, the exclusion of shareholders from the text of section 8.85 was intended to
underscore the fact that section 8.85 rejects the principle of shareholder primacy in Illinois corporate law.
66. See, e.g., Time, 571 A.2d at 1148 (accepting the board's belief that long-term
synergistic benefits and preservation of "Time Culture" justified rejection of an
attractive all-cash bid); QVC, 637 A.2d at 41 (rejecting takeover bid because Paramount
board believed transaction favored by incumbent management provided more
advantageous business prospects for the corporation).
67. Those who oppose hostile takeovers often claim that they are furthering the best
long-term interests of the corporation. See e.g., Time, 571 A. 2d at 1148. See
generally Martin Lipton and Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 205-13
(1991). Indeed, the Illinois General Assembly's addition of the "long-term interests"
language to § 8.85 in 1989 can plausibly be read as a signal of its support for the notion
that the interest of the corporate enterprise, as defined by incumbent management,
should be of paramount importance to directors in discharging their fiduciary duties.
68. Puzzlingly, § 8.85, unlike many corporate constituency statutes, also omits
creditors from the list of constituents whose interests the directors are expressly
authorized to consider. Cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101 B(l)(a) (West 1995)
(authorizing directors to consider effects of takeover bid on "creditors" and other
constituents). The failure to list creditors as one of the § 8.85 corporate constituents
does not cause the same interpretative problems as does the exclusion of shareholders.
Historically, the debate over the corporate directors' fiduciary duties has not been
centered around creditors. Courts to date have rebuffed efforts to increase the scope of
the fiduciary duties owed by directors to include creditors. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co; v. RJR Nabisco, 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Creditors are owed
fiduciary duties in special circumstances associated with the insolvency of the
corporation. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. For arguments that the
corporate law should give greater protection to creditors see Bratton, supra note 29;
Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 265-312
(1988).
69. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Unfortunately, the General Assembly's failure to mention shareholders in section 8.85, though possibly meant to underscore an important clarification in Illinois corporate law, potentially causes mischief. For example, a fair argument can be made that, by omitting
shareholders from section 8.85's list of corporate constituents, the
General Assembly intended to retain both the traditional privileged
position of shareholders vis-A-vis other corporate constituents and the
notion that directors continue to owe the same fiduciary duties to the
corporation as its shareholders.7" This narrow reading of section
8.85, however, though theoretically plausible, is not well supported.
As described above,7 ' corporate constituency statutes were adopted
to rebuff a powerful legal doctrine equating the fiduciary duties of
corporate directors with shareholder wealth maximization. Interpreting
section 8.85's silence with respect to shareholders as protecting the
prerogatives of the shareholders conflicts with the historical roots of
corporate constituency statutes.
Furthermore, section 8.85 ties the primary duty of the directors to
the best interests of the corporation. Had the General Assembly
intended only to codify the then prevailing common law rule that directors owe a fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its shareholders,72 section 8.85 would have been drafted differently to provide
that in considering the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholdersthe directors may consider the impact on other constituents. Thus, the absence of shareholders from the language of section
8.85 is entirely consistent with the view that section 8.85 is intended to
modify the common law rule by establishing that the directors owe a
primary fiduciary duty to the corporation alone.

70. Many other corporate constituency statutes also omit shareholders from the list
of constituents, which has prompted some commentators to conclude that constituency
statutes represent no more than the "confirm[ation of] what the common law has been:
directors may take into account the interests of other constituencies but only as and to
the extent that the directors are acting in the best interests, long as well as short term, of
the shareholders and the corporation." ABA COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, OTHER
CONSTITUENCIES STATUTES: POTENTIAL FOR CONFUSION, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2269 (1990);
see also Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46
Bus. LAW. 1355, 1375 (1991) (concluding that statutes concerning non-shareholder
constituents should be seen as a codification of the common law for each state). Other
commentators vehemently disagree with this view of corporate constituency statutes.
See, e.g., Millon, supra note 18, at 256-57.
7 I. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text, and see supra part III.A.
72. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prior view
that directors owed a common fiduciary duty to the corporation and the shareholders.
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C. Section 8.85 Is Consistent With American CorporateLaw
Traditions
At first glance, section 8.85, like other corporate constituency
statutes, appears to offend fundamental principles of corporate law by
eliminating shareholder primacy. The notion of shareholder wealth
maximization is a long-standing principle deeply ingrained in American
corporate law.73 Courts have long observed that
[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors
are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is
to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among shareholders
in order to devote them to other purposes.74
Upon closer examination, however, section 8.85 represents a much
less radical shift in corporate law than may first appear. Over the past
two hundred years, the prevailing conception of the nature and
purpose of the corporation and, thus, of the nature of the duties owed
by corporate directors has changed dramatically. 7 5 The notion that the
directors' primary duty is to act on behalf of the interests of the shareholders-the putative "owners" of the corporation-represents but one
approach. Over time, the law developed alternatives to this approach.
A convincing alternative to the shareholder primacy approach views
the corporation as an entity vested with its own rights and interests.76
Under this "entity theory," the interests of the various corporate
constituents, including shareholders, are subordinated to the greater
good of the corporate entity. Corporate directors and officers owe
their primary duty to the corporation and not to the shareholders per
se.77 As discussed above,7 8 section 8.85 represents a rejection of the
73.

ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW §

16.2 (1986).

74. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
75. See generally, David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J. 20523. (discussing how theories of the corporation have developed and changed over the
last one hundred and fifty years).
76. Millon, supra note 75, at 211-20; see also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992).
77. Id. at 211-20. Another approach to understanding the corporation that held sway
in the first half of the 1800's was to view the primary duty of the corporation as serving
the public interest. Id. at 207. This view prevailed at a time when the states granted
narrow charters to corporations to perform some public function; it has little
contemporary relevance, when state corporation statutes place few restrictions on the
business activities of corporations. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/3.05
(1992) (allowing corporations to be organized for any lawful purpose); see also Steven
M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and
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shareholder primacy approach in favor of the entity approach.
IV. NEW CHALLENGES FOR DIRECTORS OF ILLINOIS
CORPORATIONS: DEFINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CORPORATION

While section 8.85 clarifies an important aspect of Illinois corporate
law, it also creates new ambiguities and challenges. Section 8.85
poses a difficult challenge to directors of Illinois corporations. The
statute fails to define the best interests of a reified entity like the
"corporation" because the law neither supplies a single fiduciary duty
standard-such as shareholder wealth maximization-nor specifies a
corporate constituency whose interests the directors are to treat as
preeminent.
A. The Scope of DiscretionSection 8.85 Vests in Corporate
Directors:Broad but not Unbridled
Prior to the enactment of section 8.85, directors could use shareholder wealth maximization as a surrogate for the best interests of the
corporation, at least when corporate control was not at stake. 9
Although section 8.85 does not require directors to deviate from the
profit maximization norm, it certainly allows directors to deviate from
that practice. It appears that the General Assembly intended that
section 8.85 would encourage directors to view the scope of their
fiduciary duties more broadly, to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituents, and to act in the best long-term interests of the
corporation.
Significantly, section 8.85 does not even mention
shareholders as a constituent whose interests may be considered. 8'
Section 8.85 allows directors to define the corporate mission much
more broadly than under prior law. For example, section 8.85 may
allow a board of directors to substitute a business strategy designed to
maximize the economic return realized by the corporation's constituents as a whole, in effect replacing a strategy designed to maximize
Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991) (arguing that corporate
constituency statutes are consistent with well-established corporate law norms).
78. See supra notes 40-72 and accompanying text.
79. The common law formulation that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders encouraged this identity of interests.
80. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes, 19 PEPp. L. REv. 971 (1992) (arguing that non-shareholder constituents as well
as shareholders deserve their share of the corporate benefits).
8 1. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance
of this omission.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 27

corporate profits. Section 8.85 would appear to shield such a broad
strategy from challenge even if the shareholder returns are reduced as a
result of the strategy. Presumably, section 8.85 would also allow
directors to define the best interests of the corporation by maximizing
the economic and non-economic returns to the various corporate constituents.8 2
Although section 8.85 grants directors broad discretion in defining
the best interests of the corporation, such discretion is not absolute.
Other provisions of the BCA, 83 as well as common law restraints on
director power,84 impose limitations on the discretion of corporate
directors. Section 12.50(b) of the BCA,85 for example, allows a court
to order dissolution of the corporation, or invoke certain alternative
remedies,86 when a shareholder demonstrates that those in control of
the corporation are engaged in fraud, corporate waste or "oppression"
of shareholders.87
Reconciling section 8.85 with the common law and statutory
prohibitions against oppression of shareholders will be an interesting
task if the directors of Illinois corporations aggressively utilize section
8.85 to pursue corporate goals that, however laudable and beneficial to
the corporate enterprise, do not promote shareholder wealth maximization. Unfortunately, case law does not provide guidance on the
interplay between section 8.85 and the shareholder's remedy against
"oppression.,89

82. Examples of non-monetary returns include the tangible and psychic benefits from
stable work relationships, work safety measures above those required by law, flexible
work hours, measures designed to support employees who are parents, and extra efforts
to recruit employees from disadvantaged communities The list of possibilities is
endless. See Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontierof Capitalism:An Implementation of
Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50.2
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1625 (1993).
83. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. CH. 805, § 5/1.01 (West 1995).
84. See 13 ILLINOIS LAW AND PRACTICE, Corporations, §§ 321-358 (1955 & Supp.
1994) (summarizing Illinois common law restraints on actions by corporate directors).
85. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/12.50(b) (West 1992).
86. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/12.55 lists the alternatives to dissolution:
court appointment of a receiver or custodian or a court-supervised buyout of the
complaining shareholder's stock. The Illinois Legislature recently passed legislation
overhauling §§ 12.50-12.65 of the BCA. Among other things, the legislation expands
the list of remedies which may be invoked by close corporation shareholders who are
"oppressed" by those in control of the corporation. See IL Senate Bill 433.
87. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/12.50(b) (West 1992). The common law
prohibition against corporate waste is also a check on any abuses of § 8.85. See Saxe v.
Brady, 184 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1962).
88. It is important to note, however, that the "oppression" remedy never figured in
any significant way in the corporate takeover cases over the last decade.
89. The statutory remedy protecting shareholders against oppression is closely
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Such lack of judicial guidance leaves several important questions
unanswered which, in turn, creates ambiguities and uncertainties for
corporate directors. For example, would it constitute shareholder
oppression for a company to slash dividends to zero in order to preserve the jobs of employees if a shareholder could prove that the
company was heavily overstaffed relative to its competitors? What if,
in such a case, the directors could make a colorable showing that they
reasonably believed that promoting stable long-term employment
relationships was in the best long-term interests of the corporation?
Likewise, is it a "waste" of corporate assets to pursue corporate goals
of, for example, standards of product quality well over what the
market demands, above-market pay and benefit levels for lower-level
employees, or unusually high levels of corporate philanthropy?
Market forces provide the strongest restraints on the discretion of
corporate directors. The legal latitude that section 8.85 gives directors
in defining the best interests of the corporation does not magically
insulate the corporation from market forces which demand a high
degree of fealty to the goal of profit maximization. For lenders and
trade creditors, a corporate board's interest in promoting "stable longterm relationships," or its glowing vision of a bright long-term corporate future, is no substitute for a business that generates sufficient cash
flow to service its debts. Shareholders also get restive if the company
fails to generate a competitive rate of return.
A publicly traded company that generates a relatively low rate of
return experiences low demand for its stock and other securities, raising the company's cost of capital and weakening its competitive status.
In many industries, global competitive forces in the product market
compel a business which hopes to survive to make difficult decisions-including layoffs, plant closings and the like-which have an
immediate negative impact upon non-shareholder constituencies.9"
Thus, the international market for corporate control, to the extent it is
not stifled by corporate constituency provisions, state antitakeover
statutes and other deterrents such as "poison pills," operates to displace incumbent management that fails to realize the full profit potential
related to common law fiduciary duty protections. See generally Robert B. Thompson,
The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW. 699 (1993) (surveying
the states' treatment of remedies for minority shareholders in close corporations).
90. Especially in this period of intense international competition and extensive
"downsizing," corporate management is accustomed to articulating why the best
interests of the corporation require actions that have an adverse effect on various
corporate constituents. Thus, having directors define the corporation's best long term
interests in a legal regime where shareholders are no longer primary is not an
impossible task for directors.
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from corporate assets. 9'
The corporate structure of most Illinois corporations provides
additional protection from unbridled director discretion. The vast majority of Illinois corporations function as so-called "close corporations. 92 Close corporations typically consist of a few shareholders
who operate and control the business. In many close corporations,
the shareholders are also simultaneously the "other constituents" by
holding positions as employees, creditors and suppliers.94 Thus, the
structure of most Illinois corporations promotes a rough identity of
interest between the shareholders and the other corporate constituents,
ensuring that profit generation will remain of key importance.
B. Section 8.85 In Action: How the CorporateConstituency Statute
May Alter CorporatePractice
Critics of constituency statutes argue that making directors primarily
accountable to something as amorphous as the "corporation" and
allowing directors to define the corporation's best interests creates a
risk of opportunistic and inefficient behavior. 95 One hopeful response
to such criticism is that a broader view of the corporation as a web of
interdependent relationships that needs to be carefully nurtured is
needed in order for American businesses to increase their long-term
competitiveness.96
Corporate constituency statutes provide a legal environment that
arguably will strengthen the American corporation for the rigors of
global competition by fostering directors' consideration of a broad
range of interests using a long-term perspective in order to best
develop the corporate enterprise. 97 Moreover, the market constraints
9 1. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21.
92. See New York Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) pp. 715-800 (1994) (listing
relatively few Illinois corporations whose securities are listed on the NYSE).
93. See Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (III. 1965); Hagshans v. Gaylord, 557
N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). See generally Thomas J. Bamonte, Expanding the
Duties of Close CorporationShareholders: The Dilemma Facing Illinois Corporate Law,
15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. -,
(1995) (forthcoming).
94. See, e.g. Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Pollack Indus., 382 N.E.2d 393 (111.App. Ct.
1978) (discussing that sole shareholder of corporation was also one of the corporation's
creditors).
95. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing With Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes in the 1990's, 21 STETSON. L. REV. 97, 109-117 (1991); SEcTION OF BUSINESS
LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASsocIATION, OTHER CONSTITUENCIES STATUTES: POTENTIAL

FOR CONFUSION, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253 (1990).
9 6. See Patrick J. Ryan, Calculating the "Stakes" for Corporate Stakeholders as Part
of Business Decision-Making, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 555 (1992).
97. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and
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on corporations" make it unlikely that corporate constituency statutes
will either prescribe "economic folly,"9or cover the systematic looting
of corporations by insiders. Thus, in most situations, directors will
find that the best interests of the shareholders, as residual claimants to
the corporation's cash flow, and the best interests of the "corporation"
as a whole will be allied.
Section 8.85 may come into play, however, in two situations where
shareholder interests often diverge from those of other constituents.
First, even before Illinois enacted section 8.85, the law recognized that
when a corporation approaches insolvency, shareholder interests must
yield to those of the corporation's creditors." ° Prior to insolvency,
shareholders have little to lose and much to gain if the corporation
embarks on a risky business strategy that may resuscitate the troubled
corporation. On the other hand, risky business endeavors more often
than not will deplete assets which could have gone to the creditors in
the event of bankruptcy and thus operate contrary to the best interests
of the creditors. Therefore, when a corporation nears insolvency,
directors become trustees for the creditors.
Section 8.85 is innovative in that it allows directors to follow the
same strategy whether or not the corporation approaches insolvency.'0 ' In other words, section 8.85 allows directors, under the
rubric of the "best interests of the corporation," to tailor the company's
business strategy to maximize the expected return for all corporate
constituents, rather than just the shareholders. As a result, marginal
companies not yet on the brink of insolvency may undertake a more
the United States, 102 YALE L. J. 1927 (1993); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human
Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management
Cooperation,78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993). For an opinion urging caution in
attempting to change American corporate law to mimic foreign examples, see Roberta
Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative CorporateLaw, 102
YALE L. J. 2021 (1993).
98. See supra part IL.A for a discussion of market constraints as well as other
limitations on director discretion.
99. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96-97 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
100. See In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d. Cir. 1985); F.D.I.C. v. Sea Pines
Co., 692 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983); In re Xonics,
Inc., 99 B.R. 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621
A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (1991); New York Credit
Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1953). See generally Gregory
V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the Financially
Troubled Company, 48 Bus. LAW. 239 (1992) (surveying case law regarding fiduciary
duties owed by directors of insolvent companies and those approaching insolvency).
101. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/8.85 (West 1995). The statute does not
facially distinguish between insolvent and solvent situations. Id.
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conservative short-term business strategy. However, for most companies, market forces likely will demand close attention to shareholder
wealth maximization and, thus, preclude changes in business strategy.
Section 8.85 may also come into play when corporate control is at
stake. Section 8.85, consistent with the Unocal"°2 approach, allows
directors and officers to consider a wide range of interests when
responding to a takeover bid.'0 3 The more difficult question remains
whether section 8.85 impacts on the so-called Revlon' ° duties, which
requires directors and officers to pursue shareholder wealth maximization when a change in corporate control is inevitable.
Delaware, the home of the Unocal and Revlon decisions, does not
have a corporate constituency statute, and the limited case law from
other jurisdictions sheds little light on the question.'0 5 Certainly, in
many situations, directors will have legitimate grounds for believing
that selling or liquidating the company furthers the best interests of the
corporation and its various constituents.' °6 Section 8.85 should have
no effect on such a determination.
What about the situation in which such a sale or liquidation does not
necessarily advance the best interests of the corporation or its constituents? According to Revlon, once the directors decide to sell or liquidate the corporation, few grounds, if any, exist for considering the interests of corporate constituents because the corporation ceases to be

102. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1989) (stating
that corporate directors may consider non-shareholder interests when protecting the
corporate enterprise from harm stemming from a hostile takeover). See supra notes 31
and 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of this approach.
103. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/8.85 (West 1995). The statute allows the
directors to consider the interests of, among others, employees, customers, and
communities in which the corporation is located. Id.
104. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (discussing the duty of a board of directors to maximize a company's value when
faced with the corporation's breakup). See supra notes 30 and 34 and accompanying text
for a discussion of these duties.
105. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31 (D. Me.
1989); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.
Wis. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
955 (1989); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa.
1987); Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
106. Situations in which directors may reasonably conclude that continued
independence is not in the best interest of the corporation are too numerous to list
comprehensively. Common situations include where a company realizes that it lacks
the capital or other resources to compete in a changing market, the absence of a strong
successor after the founder of a family-owned business retires, or the presence of a bidder
who offers an attractive price and the promise that the existing corporate constituents
will have a continuing role in the new enterprise.
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ongoing. '0 7 Section 8.85 may modify the Revlon duties by allow-ing
directors to consider the best interests of the corporation at every step
of the auction process.
Under section 8.85, directors might conclude that the sale of the
company to the highest bidder would be so injurious to one or more
corporate constituents that the best interests of the corporation requires
selling the company to another bidder, who promises better treatment
for the constituents after the sale. This might occur, for example,
when the sale of the corporation to the highest bidder would have such
a significant negative impact on a corporate constituent that the directors conclude that the sale fails to comport with the corporation's long10 8
followed standards for the treatment of the corporate constituents.
Section 8.85 similarly would allow directors to reject takeover bids
which they believe would, if accepted, likely lead to the insolvency of
the company.'09
In sum, contrary to the views of one early interpreter, '0 section
8.85 does not significantly change the common law duties of directors
when corporate control is at stake. Section 8.85 only allows directors
to avoid mechanical application of the Revlon shareholder wealth
maximization rile.
C. Enforcing Section 8.85: Who May Bring Suit Alleging a
Violation of the CorporateConstituency Statute?
Many commentators have argued that corporate constituency statutes
do not vest non-shareholder constituents with standing to sue either to
force directors to fully and fairly take into account their interests or to
recover damages if the directors fail to adequately consider their
interests."' Section 8.85 gives no indication of being an exception; it
107. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (["C]oncern for non-stockholder interests is
inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no
longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest
bidder.").
108. Of course, directors who fail to act with a requisite degree of care in evaluating a
takeover bid, or who feign concern about a corporate constituent in order to thwart a
takeover bid, or who favor a bid promising lucrative side payments to incumbent
management still face liability for breach of a fiduciary duty to the shareholders. See
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1993);
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
109. See Weiboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1988).
110. See Kaplan, supra note 37, at 376-77.
111. See John C. Carter, The Rights of Other Corporate Constituencies, 22 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 491 (1992) (stating that corporate directors have little direct liability to the
constituencies other than shareholders); Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the
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does not require directors to give any consideration to any corporate
constituent." 2 By tying director duties to the best interests of the
corporation, section 8.85 appears to vest only the corporation, or its
shareholders suing derivatively, with standing to sue for a breach of
the duty to act on the corporation's behalf." 3
From the perspective of non-shareholder corporate constituents,
section 8.85 appears toothless." 4 Indeed, there are many critics who
view corporate constituency statutes as just another management entrenchment device foisted on shareholders by state legislatures held
captive by powerful local companies." 5
Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156, 1173 (1993) (stating that the
corporate constituency statutes do not impose new duties on directors enforceable by
creditors, employees, and other constituencies and warning that a "litigation explosion"
would result if such duties were imposed). Strong arguments in favor of implying at least
limited causes of action on behalf of non-shareholder constituents are found in Millon,
supra note 18, at 257-60; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and PracticalFramework
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992).
112. Of course, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where directors could identify
the corporation's best interests without reference to any constituent.
113. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805 § 5/7.80 (West 1995) (Illinois derivative
action statute). Some corporate constituency statutes explicitly state that they do not
create any new duties owed by a director. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b)
(McKinney 1986).
114. See Millon, supra note 18, at 276 (noting that unless the constituency statutes
are interpreted as imposing affirmative obligations on management, non-shareholders
will receive little benefit from the statutes).
115. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 37, at 376-77 (stating that Section 8.85 reinforces
management's defense posture against its own shareholders leaving shareholders
defenseless against the hostile takeover maneuvers initiated by their own management);
see also Johnson & Millon supra note 36; Romano, supra note 35.
By allowing directors to consider the interest of other constituents on par with the
interests of shareholders and by making the "corporation" the primary focus of the
fiduciary duties owed by directors, § 8.85 may make it more difficult for shareholders to
prevail on breach of fiduciary duty claims. At a minimum, shareholder plaintiffs in
breach of fiduciary duty cases should frame their case as much as possible as a claim
charging directors with breaching their duty to the corporation. Framing suits as breach
of duty claims is necessary because a shareholder plaintiff who claims a breach of
fiduciary duty owed to the shareholder likely will be confronted with a defense that the
challenged action was compelled by an overriding interest of the corporation and thus
was sanctioned by § 8.85.
The problem with a shareholder focusing a breach of fiduciary duty case on harm to the
corporation is that such an action likely will be treated as a derivative claim and will
thus be subject to the various procedural hurdles associated with derivative actions. See
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805805 § 5/7.80. (West 1995). See also Mann v. Kemper
Financial Companies, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 317 (I11.App. Ct. 1992) (discussing aspects of
individual versus derivative actions); Zokoych v. Spalding, 344 N.E.2d 805 (11. App.
Ct. 1976) (stating that individuals could bring action in case where wrongful acts violate
contractual duty). Consideration of the full implications of § 8.85 on shareholder
derivative actions is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Thomas J.
Bamonte, An Assessment of Derivative RICO Actions by Stockholders, Limited Partners
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A more charitable view, however, suggests that section 8.85 reflects
a legislative determination that the many interests at work in a
corporation must be balanced. Accordingly, the General Assembly
has apparently determined that the best way to accommodate these interests is twofold: (i) require directors to balance these interests under
the rubric of identifying and then acting in the best interests of the
"corporation," and (ii) allow directors to consider "all pertinent
factors," including the interests of non-shareholder constituents, in
perfonning this task. The General Assembly may well have concluded
that giving standing to non-shareholder constituents would generate
costly and time-consuming litigation and encourage opportunistic
behavior by powerful corporate constituents
at the expense of less
6
powerful or poorly organized constituents.' 1
The literature abounds with discussions of possible common law
causes of actions which corporate constituents might bring in response
to a corporate action, such as a plant closing, that have a major adverse
impact upon a constituency." 7 However, the causes of action
proposed by commentators, based on both contract and tort theories,
has not found substantial judicial favor thus far."'
If such causes of action ripen into viable claims, section 8.85 might
have an important role to play in defining the duties owed by corporate
directors. Assuming non-shareholders have standing, directors who
callously disregard the interests of a corporate constituent might be
viewed as reckless or worse in light of section 8.85, which gives
directors the right to take into account those interests and, when
viewed in historical context, seems to intend that they do so.' '9 At the
present time, outside of clarifying to whom directors owe their primary
and Trust Beneficiaries, 21 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 153, 157-60 (1990).
116. See Karmel, supra note 11l, at 1173.
117. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 111; O'Connor, supra note 29; Joseph Singer, The
Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
118. See Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 631
F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980); Charland v. Norge Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062
(6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969); Marine Transp. Lines, Inc. v.
International Org. of Masters, 636 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Abbington v. Dayton
Malleable, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 438 (6th Cir.
1984); Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1993). But see Glass Molders, Pottery Plastics and Allied Workers Int'l Union
v. Wickes Co., 707 F. Supp. 174 (D.N.J. 1989) (remanding the case to state court based
on a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and
negligence).
119. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 29, at 1232 ("With the widespread concern over
the economic consequences of capital mobility, social conditions may be changing so
that the courts may use stakeholder statutes as a basis for judicial intervention to
ameliorate the impact of corporate restructuring.").
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fiduciary duty, section 8.85 provides only a normative constraint on
the actions of the directors with respect to corporate constituents. "0
An interesting question posits whether section 8.85 marks the first
step towards a more radical restructuring of the corporation and of
corporate law. In other words, might constituency statutes such as
section 8.85 signal that "public" considerations, such as the impact of
corporate decisions on non-shareholder constituencies, are gradually
becoming issues to be dealt with under the rubric of the "private" law
of corporations?..'
The prospects for at least a partial shift in that direction are not as
slim as might be imagined. Other developed countries have utilized
various devices designed to ensure that corporate decision-making
more fully reflects the public dimension of corporate actions. Methods
employed include the appointment of labor representatives on corporate boards, employee participation in the election of the board of
relationships among
directors, and the development of close working
22
corporation.
the
and
suppliers
creditors,
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that states such as Illinois will be quick
to restructure their corporate law to encompass a host of "public
issues" in the near future. Protecting the prerogatives of those in
control of the corporation continues as a principle deeply rooted in
American corporate law.' 23 Given the influence of corporate management on the evolution of corporate law at the state level 24 and the
120. The importance of normative constraints should not be underestimated. See
Bernard S. Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial?: A Politicaland Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U.L. REV. 542, 573-74 (1990) (stating that cultural and extralegal norms of proper
behavior play an important part in managerial self-restraint).
121. See Millon, supra note 18, at 251-61; Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders:
Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992).
122. See Alfred F. Conard, Corporate Constituencies in Western Europe, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 73 (1991); Roberta S. Karmel, The Duty of Directors to Non-Shareholder
Constituencies in Control Transactions-A Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Law, 25 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 61 (1990); Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A
Projection of Problems and Potentials,4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155 (1982); see
also Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159 (1991)
(discussing employee ownership as a method of overseeing corporate actions).
123. See William W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case
for Constituency Rights, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1471-72 (1993); see also
William L. Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974) (discussing Delaware's pro-management treatment of corporate law).
124. See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and
Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393,
405-09 (1993); see also Thomas J. Bamonte, The Dynamics of State Protectionism: A
Short Critique of the CTS Decision, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 259 (1988) (discussing various
political pressures causing state legislatures to adopt anti-takeover legislation).
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various market constraints on state corporate law innovations,' 25 states
are unlikely to use corporate constituency statutes to reduce the powers
and prerogatives of those in control of local corporations. The
suggestion that state legislatures intended to use corporate constituency
statutes to give a host of non-shareholder constituents new causes of
action is nearly unthinkable.' 26
Section 8.85 hints at a reservoir of transformative possibilities
which someday may be tapped through political movements or judicial
innovations as yet unseen. Section 8.85 does not, however, reduce
the power wielded by incumbent management and, indeed, appears to
consolidate the control of incumbent management over Illinois
corporations.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 8.85 has attracted attention and elicited significant
commentary as an antitakeover measure. 127 Its primary significance to
Illinois corporate law, however, has been overlooked. The primary
and largely unrecognized significance of section 8.85 is that the statute
settles an important question of Illinois corporate law by establishing
that the foremost fiduciary duty of directors is to serve the best
interests of a reified entity called the "corporation." Before Section
8.85, directors owed dual and sometimes contradictory duties to the
corporation and its shareholders. Section 8.85 now establishes that the
duty owed to the corporation is primary. Section 8.85 also displaces
shareholders from the top of the legal hierarchy of corporate constituents.' 28 It vests directors with the right to consider and balance the
interests of a full range of corporate constituents in the context of both
29
regular business decisions and when corporate control is at stake.
The importance of section 8.85, thus, extends far beyond the
antitakeover realm, and its full implications have yet to be realized.

125. See Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 251 (1977) (discussing market for corporate charters);
see also Thomas J. Bamonte, Expanding the Fiduciary Duties of Close Corporation
Shareholders: The Dilemma Facing Illinois Corporate Law, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. __
(1995) (forthcoming) (discussing difficulties states face when developing a corporate
law at odds with Delaware corporate law).
126. See Bratton, supra note 123, at 1468 (concluding that an expansive
interpretation of corporate constituency laws is unlikely).
127. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 45-48 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.

